The Indaroeng Cement Works near Padang in Sumatra which were supplying cement for pillboxes and tank traps against the threatened Allied invasion, were laid in ruins by the Eastern Fleet. The Japanese strike group of 132 aircraft was detected at 07:06 on 9 April [48] by the radar of AMES 272 at a range of 91 miles (146 km). On 6 April heavy cruisers Kumano and Suzuya with destroyer Shirakumo sank the British merchant ships Silksworth, Autolycus, Malda and Shinkuang and the American ship Exmoor. The Flag Officer, Malaya commanded naval forces and establishments in Malaya including HMNB Singapore. In these circumstances, with the Japanese fleet engaged by the United States Navy (USN), the Admiralty planned to send four Revenge-class battleships to Singapore to provide defensive firepower and a British presence.

A good read and a very useful history, filing in, explaining and providing a degree of realistic balance for much more well covered naval campaigns. The Royal Navy's doctrinal mistake had been in continuing to think of Carriers as supports to Battle Fleets- and not as strike forces themselves.The rearming encountered delays, and the strike was carried out by Carrier Division 2 instead; Soryu and Hiryu began launching dive bombers at 11:45. From the strategic point of view, the Japanese offensive in the Indian Ocean was the only moment in the Second World War when the Axis forces could coordinate their efforts to severely threaten the position of the British Empire in the crucial Middle Eastern and Indian theatres. In these circumstances, Prince of Wales and Repulse, which were dispatched to intercept the invasion force, were vulnerable to concerted air attacks from the Japanese bases in Indochina and, without their own air cover, they were sunk in December 1941. Surprise was achieved: military and oil installations were heavily damaged by the attacks, aggravating Japanese fuel shortages. The British assumptions were destroyed on 7 December 1941: the impact of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor denied substantial USN support to the British defence of the "Malay barrier" and made impossible the relief of American garrisons in the Philippines.

Force A, including its two aircraft carriers, Indomitable and Formidable, retired to Bombay, [3] and Somerville regularly deployed a fast carrier force to the central Indian Ocean over the next six months, during which he operated from or near Ceylon for nearly half that time.We sometimes make mistakes in our spelling, transcription or categorisation, or miss information out of our records. Shortly after 06:00 [33] Nagumo's force began launching 91 bombers and 36 fighters for the strike on Colombo. The American involvement was extended to capitalise on the success with a second attack, this time on Surabaya, eastern Java, on 17 May ( Operation Transom). The majority of these were based at Massawa in Eritrea as part of the Italian Red Sea Flotilla, including seven destroyers and eight submarines.

The heaviest part of this task was borne by the Merchant Navy, but each ship required escort through Indian Ocean waters, now infested with Jap and German U-boats. The size of the airstrike on Colombo was Somerville's first concrete evidence that the Japanese force contained more than the two carriers he expected. The armed merchant cruiser HMS Hector, [36] the Norwegian tanker Soli [37] and the old destroyer HMS Tenedos were sunk; three other ships were damaged. In April a powerful task force of battleships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines, accompanied by both British and American aircraft-carriers bom­barded and bombed the Jap harbour base at Sabang. D. (1956), "Appendix V – Execution By Japanese of Fleet Air Arm Officers", The Royal New Zealand Navy, The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–1945, Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, Royal New Zealand Navy, pp.

On the eve of battle, RAF forces were part of 222 Group, commanded by Air Vice-Marshal John D'Albiac. The course heading conflicted with the first revision, which suggested a course toward the southeast. Even then, it required experienced air crews to find their targets at night, using radar with a range of just 20 miles (32 km) and new tactics. Ceylon and the Eastern Fleet were required to safeguard the sea lines of communications through the Indian Ocean.