Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars

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Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars

Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars

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HMS Victory and HMS Dreadnought. With the ships built more than a century apart, the past meets the present in this 1906 photo. ( Gosportheritage.co.uk)

This book relates the development and use of six important and successful technologies, but to focus on success might give the false impression that every invention has a use, or that every use has a lasting purpose, or even that technologies with the strongest pedigrees and the most clearly defined uses will continued to be relevant. For navies, the ultimate criterion is whether the weapon/tool/platform effectively advances the task of securing power at sea and contributes to ultimate victory. Animals fight with horns, teeth, and claws. Humans can bite and scratch as well, but to win, they use technology. The word technology is a compound of two Greek roots, tekhne (craft) and logia (learning). In essence, technology is the practical application of knowledge expressed through the use of a device.Whilst discussing some post World War 2 technological developments the authors generally avoid assessments arguing that the technologies have not been tested in major power conflict in more recent years, and hence accurate data is not available to sustain valid assessments. Having made these observations the authors nevertheless do make some broad statements on current capabilities. In relation to submarines, it is concluded that: “There is reason to think that they would be even more effective now, given the relative states of submarine and ASW technology.” In relation to the torpedo, the authors conclude that: “It is likely to be a part of naval arsenals for years to come and to experience more permutations before the concept is finally obsolete.” In relation to naval aviation the authors conclude that: “It is difficult to know whether the carrier has had its day, but the current crop of antiship weapons give little cause for optimism. Navies will still require wings, but those wings may well prove to be of a new type (such as unmanned drones) flying from new platforms rather than large, expensive aircraft flying from large, expensive ships.” Victory’s tactical function as a capital ship was to maneuver in formation with her fellow capital ships to a position from which she could bombard enemy ships with her broadside of cannons. The tactical function of the dreadnought battleships that fought the Battle of Jutland, 111 years after Victory’s triumph at Trafalgar, was essentially the same. So too was the tactical goal of the commanding admirals: to concentrate their firepower through maneuver while preventing their opponents from doing the same. Naval professionals throughout the long decades of peace leading up to 1914 expended great effort trying to keep pace with the tactical implications of rapidly changing capital ship technology. Line-abreast formations were tried and discarded; ramming tactics went in and out of fashion; torpedoes and speed were heralded (by some) as revolutionary. Still, by 1914 fleets of gun-armed capital ships dominated naval thinking, much as the ship of the line had more than a century before. In terms of formations, objectives, and major weapons, John Jellicoe and Reinhard Scheer, the admirals at Jutland, essentially fought the same way that Horatio Nelson and Pierre Villeneuve fought Trafalgar. All sought to concentrate the power of their big guns. Jellicoe accomplished this by crossing in front of the German line and pounding its leading ships, while Nelson split the Franco-Spanish line and defeated it in detail, but both men had the same goal. The technical innovations in the capital ships of 1914 compared to those of 1805 were enormous, but the tactical goal was still to concentrate gun power more effectively than the foe. A theme that runs throughout the book is the idea of network effects. One radio is a novelty. Many radios in a network allow rapid communications for a variety of tasks and common understanding of the situation. Other technologies are similar. For instance, many radio direction-finding antennas provide more accurate locations and greater resilience against damage. Many mines are far more effective in constraining ship movement than a few that can be avoided. If Germany had fielded 50 more submarines when World War II began, the outcome may have been quite different. The limited application of technology produces a small effect, but massive proliferation produces a great effect.

Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars studies how the world's navies incorporated new technologies into their ships, their practices, and their doctrine. It does this by examining six core technologies fundamental to twentieth-century naval warfare including new platforms (submarines and aircraft), new weapons (torpedoes and mines), and new tools (radar and radio). Each chapter considers the state of a subject technology when it was first used in war and what navies expected of it. It then looks at the way navies discovered and developed the technology's best use, in many cases overcoming disappointed expectations. It considers how a new technology threatened its opponents, not to mention its users, and how those threats were managed. The transaction is subject to customary conditions and is expected to close by the end of September 2020.The difference between the 104-gun first rate ship of the line HMS Victory of 1805 and HMS Dreadnought of 1905 is a clear example of technological progress, but where is the innovation? If the capital ship represents a synthesis of many technologies, then one can easily argue that behind the technological progress that produced this synthesis, there was profound innovation. This is true if one considers only technical innovation. One can ask whether these innovations were driven by militaries or by society in general. For example, the steam engine transformed naval warfare, but first it transformed transportation and manufacturing in general and in the process changed the world economy. Society at large and not the military drove many of the improvements in steam technology. The same is true of electromagnetic technology and even of advances in the sciences of metallurgy and chemistry that had direct applications to armor and explosives. Militaries generally regard the goal of technological innovation as a matter of progressive improvement in a proven field: larger guns firing bigger shells to greater ranges, for example. In general, navies strive to win wars with better versions of existing weapons, tools, and platforms rather than use novelties in the front line. But the greatest power of new technology comes from innovative use. What are these improved guns being fired at, and to what purpose? If they are used in the same old way, it is legitimate to repeat the question that opened this paragraph: Where is the innovation? Needs influence use. Different navies use identical technologies differently. The difference between Allied and German development of radar is a prime example of this.

Cover: Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars by Vincent P. Ohara and Leonard R. Heinz INNOVATING VICTORY New technologies do not materialize fully functional as from Aladdin’s lamp. History shows that a successful technology undergoes a process: invention, development, acceptance, deployment, and then a cycle of discovery, evolution, and exploitation. The capstone of this process is determining the technology’s best uses and then combining those with best practices for best results. In every case, the goal is a combat advantage. In 1904, 1914, and 1939, navies went to war with unproven technologies and experienced steep learning curves in trying to match expectations with practical and effective use. Should war break out tomorrow, the learning curve will be even steeper. Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars by Vincent P. O’Hara and Leonard R. Heinz. Naval Institute Press, 2022, 336 pp. The authors set themselves a bold purpose, to examine six technologies (two weapons, two tools, and two platforms), chart their influence on naval warfare, and provide “new perspectives and insights” into how technological innovation develops and progresses. The authors recognize this is a ‘vast subject, ‘ but they have done a very effective job at examining the six technologies and their use in war. I believe this is one of the great strengths of the book, the emphasis on actual use, because–as the authors correctly point out–theories about the potential of technology must regularly be revised once a new technology collides with the reality of its utility.”–Trent Hone, author, Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945 Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars studies how the world’s navies incorporated new technologies into their ships, their practices, and their doctrine. It does this by examining six core technologies fundamental to twentieth-century naval warfare including new platforms (submarines and aircraft), new weapons (torpedoes and mines), and new tools (radar and radio). Each chapter considers the state of a subject technology when it was first used in war and what navies expected of it. It then looks at the way navies discovered and developed the technology’s best use, in many cases overcoming disappointed expectations. It considers how a new technology threatened its opponents, not to mention its users, and how those threats were managed. Innovating Victory shows that the use of technology is more than introducing and mastering a new weapon or system. Differences in national resources, force mixtures, priorities, perceptions, and missions forced nations to approach the problems presented by new technologies in different ways. Navies that specialized in specific technologies often held advantages over enemies in some areas but found themselves disadvantaged in others. Vincent P. O’Hara and Leonard Heinz present new perspectives and explore the process of technological introduction and innovation in a way that is relevant to today’s navies, which face challenges and questions even greater than those of 1904, 1914, and 1939. Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars by Vincent P. O’Hara – eBook DetailsEach chapter begins with an account of the technology’s early development, including its first adoption by navies and initial expectations surrounding it. Next, the chapter discusses the discovery phase. For mines, torpedoes, and radio, this is the Russo-Japanese War; for submarines and aircraft, World War I; and for radar, World War II. Once the discovery phase is covered, the chapter focuses on evolution. In most cases this occurred after the war in which discovery took place, although submarines passed through both a discovery phase and an evolution phase during World War I, and radar did the same in World War II. After evolution, the exploitation of the fully developed technology is examined. For five of the technologies, the exploitation phase occurred in World War II; radio was sufficiently developed by 1914 to be exploited in both wars. Countermeasures and further evolution are discussed where relevant. The section describing the exploitation of the technology in World War II is followed by a summary of postwar developments and a brief review of the technology’s current state. Each chapter concludes with lessons to be learned.



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